Tag Archives: Richard Weaver

Our (Un?)Natural Transparency

The skill of “reading” each other turns out to be one of the crucial markers of a person’s social intelligence. State-of-mind inferences we make about others are what make rich connections possible. 

In a lifetime of studying human rhetoric, one short passage from master rhetorician and theorist Richard Weaver has stayed with me. It is a thought that for me has turned into an intellectual anchor. In a brief summation of one of his articles focusing on political argument he wrote that “style in speech always causes one to be a marked man.” His point was that we give ourselves away, especially our political tendencies, in the specific ways we shape our ideas. Even lies can be indicative of a person’s state of mind. The more Donald Trump claims he “always” draws big crowds, the more observers are justified in concluding that he measures his self-worth in attention from others. His rhetoric gives him away.

second thoughts

In a piece almost ten years ago I argued a version of this point that a person’s inner state of mind can be estimated from even a modest sample of their everyday rhetoric. I called the piece “Finding Interiority,” claiming that a person’s routine language offers a window into their thinking. We are the species that ponders, muses, worries, fears, hopes and ruminates. Those states of mind easily surface and give us important clues. Indeed, most of us find it hard to conceal what is going on inside. The result is that we routinely construct our responses to others based on the intentions and feelings that show up in their rhetoric.

Not surprisingly, our skill at “reading” each other turns out to be one of the crucial markers of social intelligence. Our estimates of another’s needs usually allow us to meet them at least halfway. These efforts to know another at least a little are a useful reminder of how much we depend upon what psychologists sometimes call “theory of mind,” which is another way of describing the skill of inferring mental states of others. The trigger is almost always our statements and their accompanying physical expressions: even simple cues like frowns or smiles. Inferred needs and aspirations quickly make others around us less than strangers. Does Donald Trump not notice that his words so obviously reveal his needs and fears?  We notice what his rhetoric signifies, not what it says. But he seems to be a captive of the surfaces of thought. For thousands of years we have more or less operated under the assumption expressed in Hebrew and Christian texts that ‘what a person thinks in his heart, so he is’  (Book of Proverbs 23:7).

 Actor Matt Damon in The Talented Mr. Ripley (1999)

But are we really so cognitively naked? Not always. And the exceptions are just as interesting. In the character of Tom Ripley, Patricia Highsmith reminds us what is at stake if a person manages to pull off a total deception of benign intent. Under the cover of a seemingly pleasant personality, her character schemed to murder a wealthy “friend” to inherit his lush life. We may be wired to make estimates of another’s state of mind based on almost anything they say, but we can still get it wrong by marrying the wrong person, buying a salesperson’s deceptive pitch, or being deceived by a new employer.

The risk of misreading another is one reason we are drawn to plays and actors who professionally manipulate the tools of psychic exposure. The first two acts of a play or film typically give us hints of character usually not noticed by other players. And so the final act sorts things out in ways an audience has begun to anticipate.  The play could be Edward Albee’s searing Who’s Afraid of Virginia Wolfe, Arthur Miller’s The Death of a Salesman, or a docudrama about the fraudulent science of Elizabeth Theranos. 

When we Claim Authorship for Words that are not Our Own

There are some additional challenges to Weaver’s conclusion that we are  easily “read.”  Most high-functioning adults have learned to build at least a partial screen of privacy. Friends can surprise us with unanticipated feelings or reactions. Profound depression and even suicide can come as a shock to friends who had no idea that a person was in deep despair.

And now a new wrinkle. We need to wonder who is the real author of a person’s words. What if I don’t have to use my own personal lexicon and experiences to communicate thoughts? Can’t A.I. do the task as well, offering some generic approximation of our ideas?  I was recently in conversation with a lawyer who marveled at the time he was saving by using A.I. in his correspondence. I responded that those thoughts on the page weren’t his. He should insist on using his own words. “No matter,” was the reply. The A.I. version was close enough.

Granted, lawyers deal with a lot of boilerplate communication, which is why men are often asked in questionnaires if they are pregnant.  But I worry that we are raising generations who will be unprepared to engage in the invention of expressive ideas. The act of writing or speaking our thoughts requires the mental effort–full invention–to find the right ways to give voice to our beliefs and concerns. Language stripped of the nuances of individuality may work, but badly and more or less like customer-service chatbots. We allow ourselves to become mute when other people or machines begin to speak on our behalf.  Giving up our rights of personal authorship should matter.

It is a core part of our nature to carry signs of our uniqueness in the thoughts and expressions we favor. When it is even possible, rhetorical camouflage is not a help to others or ourselves.

The Melioristic Bias

President Obama signing the Affordable Care Act in 2010
 President Obama signing the Affordable Care Act in 2010

The melioristic perspective is a useful indicator of how an individual has constituted the future and their role in it.

When most people use the term “rhetoric,” they usually mean it as the name for a verbal facade: an artificial construction far removed from what a person actually thinks.  But a University of Chicago thinker a generation ago made a convincing case that our rhetoric tends to have its own unique “signature.”  Our words, he noted, always “mark” us.

Richard Weaver
         Richard Weaver

Richard Weaver never demonstrated his point more convincingly than in his observation that the sciences have a “melioristic bias.”1  His idea was that those working in the social sciences have faith in their abilities to find solutions to human problems that will make things better.  That’s the essence of the bias: a conviction that human institutions tend to evolve rather than devolve.  His point was that our scientific discourse reveals how much we operate on the underlying assumption that we can ameliorate social dislocations.  From this perspective, a program like Social Security is an answer to the once chronic problem of old-age poverty.  It’s the result of the kind of progressive lawmaking in the mid-1930s that many of us still admire.

Here’s the interesting thing about the melioristic bias. Operating on the assumption of the transformative power of institutions is what gives political progressivism its energy. Challenging social conditions are seen as opportunities for fixes, reforms and new policies that can further the cause of social justice.  This belief is the core catechism of American liberalism.

Weaver became an important figure in the evolution of conservative thought in the 1960s.  It seems clear from his work that he viewed the “true” political conservative as someone who is more willing to accept certain human tendencies as givens and less amenable to bureaucratic fixes.  In simple terms, societies are not going to be significantly transformed for the better simply by using the rhetoric and machinery of social change, which ask for more than it is in the nature of institutions to deliver.

This belief in the need to recognize certain “essences” of human nature was central to Weaver’s view.  From his perspective the rhetoric of change and the realities of change are two different things.  We may idealize a solution—increased access to medical care in the Affordable Care Act, for example—but the actual organizational response to a given social issue is always going to be problematic. A conservative usually can’t imagine so complex a piece of organizational planning as likely to be effective.

This skeptical stance is representative of a baseline view that puts greater faith in individual human agency rather than bureaucratic power, a difference that explains the “government-is- the-problem-not-the solution” logic that thrived in the Reagan years and survives in the current Republican Congress.  Somehow massive corporations are mostly seen as immune to the same problems.

Of course this simplified view of the world overlooks how individuals can be dispersed along the continuum that separates these polar opposites. Nonetheless, it remains a useful kind of insight to look for the melioristic perspective as a sign of how an individual has constituted the future and their role in it. See the world as a place of eminently doable reforms–still my view, even though its picked up some dings over the years–and you have a reasonable indicator of a political liberal. In contrast, identify someone who sees progress largely through individual rather than organizational initiatives, and you have probably discovered a classical conservative. Either way, the bias is easily discovered when a person’s rhetoric drifts toward consequential topics.

1Richard Weaver, The Ethics of Rhetoric (Chicago: Gateway, 1953), 194-200.

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Comments: Woodward@tcnj.edu