Tag Archives: Steven Spielberg

Is Music Translatable?

Media theorist Marshall McLuhan reminded us that one medium is not easily translated into another.

Almost to the day that I finished a 600-page biography of composer John Williams, a friend sent me a copy of an article by the critic Jacques Barzun affirming the idea that music is not easily reducible to meaningful discussion.  The issue is whether the stipulative qualities of ordinary language can add much to what musicians have “said” in the non-stipulative patterns of organized sound that are so attractive. Any discussion here is a thought experiment; It probes the nature of our love affair for sounds that–strictly speaking–do not “mean” any one thing.

Tim Greiving’s new book, A Composer’s Life: John Williams, is an exhaustive review of the hundreds of scores the composer produced, starting with episodic television in the 60s and carrying through to the serialized epics of Star Wars (1977), Harry Potter (2002), Jurassic Park (1993), and many other Steven Spielberg epics. Who can forget the feeling of being lifted by the climax of E.T. the Extra Terrestrial (1982), when soaring score matched a soaring Henry on a bike taking the alien back to the mother ship? In its way it was grand opera, with audiences sharing the thrill of an injustice being set right. Williams sought the same impact in scores for films like Schindler’s List (1983) and Jaws (1975).

Greiving is effective in connecting the dots of Williams life, and is especially interesting in suggesting the commercial and logistical arrangements necessary to bring an orchestral score to the screen. I’m less certain the book’s detailed discussions of various motifs or specific chord progressions adds much to the pleasure that happens when we experience them. That observation gets us back to the question at hand. Greiving’s otherwise excellent study does begin to drag in extended discussions less memorable films in mostly forgotten films.

Of course we learn something from the mostly Italian expressions passed on by the composer in a score. It means something that Williams wrote a significant amount of music with the manuscript notation of “Religioso,” especially in his big memorial set pieces like Saving Private Ryan’s Hymn to the Fallen (1998). But, in the end, notations of expression or naming the unique tonal moves of a piece may hardly matter to anyone except the musicians and avid appreciators. The key question is whether there is more to say in ordinary language. Does insight or wonder stop with the music itself, leaving our discussions as unsubstantial afterthoughts?

An easy answer is that words about musical form can enhance what we are hearing. Libraries of words about music can be vast and maybe compelling and revealing. That is surely what Leonared Bernstein thought in his famous 1973 Norton Lectures at Harvard. If there ever was a valiant effort to marry musical sounds with their meanings, these six lectures are it.  It is no surprise that Bernstein leans heavily on what may be the slight cheat of using generative linquistics to bring its music to life. It suggests that music is just another “language:” a common but perhaps limiting metaphor that needs a harder look.

#   #   #

Barzun notes that some musical authorities believe that “anything you say about music, other than technical, will be silly or irrelevant.”  Media theorist Marshall McLuhan similarly reminded us, one medium is not easily translated into another. The problem is when we begin to think of various forms of exchange as simple “carriers” of meaning. The metaphor suggests that content and the vehicle that carries it are distinct and easily separated. This is often how we think about language. But while It may help to learn about classical music’s Sonata form or the A-A-B-A structure of a lot of pop music, full appreciation hardly depends on knowing these patterns. And we are not going to get far by falling back onto the overworked and false dualism that music is a form of feeling separate from rationality. But speaking phenomenologically, these effects involve the whole individual.  Music marries the two.

In this regard, Barzan hints of an insight that he dismisses too soon. In passing, he reminds us that some people have what is called “synesthesia,” or the perception of a particular color tied to a note or sound. Indeed, spin out this idea to its more general application and we have real translation that converts or compliments music as experience. Most of us have sense-experiences that we tie to particular songs or scores we know well.  Barzan is surely right to note that “Whatever the cause, the tie between inarticulate sounds and bodily states [that we can verbalize] is a fact of experience.”  This is clearly written on the faces of pop singer Laufey’s stageside audiences as as with listeners of the “affirmation of life” last movement of Gustav Mahler’s 5th Symphony. Surely it is natural to use favored images or experiences as touchstones for our enthusiasms.

And a final caveat. Since experience is processed mostly using the reservoir of a person’s available language, it may well be that we lack the kind of descriptive terminology that would do more justice to an attempt at rich translation. Might a sophisticated discussion of any work needs a better terminology than is usually available to a person who thinks and speaks in mostly one idiom? This is in addition to the reminder that turning music’s open-ended form into any stipulative language is bound to have limitations.

red concave bar 1

Artificial Intelligence Reconsidered Eight Years Later

Second Thoughts Banner[My confidence in 2015 that we have nothing to fear from Artificial Intelligence may look distinctly antique in light of the warnings now coming from A.I. researchers. Even Elon Musk is calling for a moratorium in the implementation of dense generative language systems that can replicate the words, sounds and images of humans. Maybe the confidence expressed in the piece below is a tad high. And my examples are dated. But let me take a minority view and argue that most of the claims made below still hold. We can now surely pass off good fakes. Humans have always had a knack for that. But it remains true that machines and software lack a self. What is essential to the human experience is our natural impulse to interpret others. This capacity has no meaningful counterpart in machine-generated language; machines lack the features of human character that always give our thoughts tendencies. We are interpreters more than recorders of our world.
There is another problem in the current hand-wringing that I have seen. Everyone seems to be describing humans as information-transfer organisms. But, in truth, we are not very good at creating reliable accounts of events. What we seem hardwired to do is to communicate our understanding of events around us. Human understandings come from prior experience. For example, does a chatbot “like” the music of Franz Joseph Haydn? I could care less. Judgments and understandings about human products must be made by other humans.]

We are awash in articles, books and films about the coming age of “singularity:” the point at which machines will supposedly duplicate and surpass human intelligence. For decades it’s been the stuff of science fiction, reaching perhaps its most eloquent expression in Stanley Kubrick’s 1968 motion picture, 2001: A Space Odyssey. The film is still a visual marvel. Who would have thought that Strauss waltzes and images of deep space could be so compatible? Functionally, the waltzes have the effect of juxtaposing the familiar with a hostile void, making the film a surprising celebration of all things earthbound. But that’s another story.

The central agent in the film is the HAL-9000 computer that begins to turn off the life support of the crew during a long voyage, mostly because it “thinks” the humans aren’t up to the enormous task facing them.

Kubrick’s vision of very smart computers is also evident in the more recent A.I., Artificial Intelligence (2001), a project started just before his death and eventually brought to the screen by Steven Spielberg. It’s a dystopian nightmare. In the film intelligent “mechas” (mechanical robots) are generally nicer than the humans who created them. In pleasant Haddonfield New Jersey, of all places, they are shot on sight for sport.

watson wikipedia.org
                        Watson wikipedia.org

Fantasies of machine intelligence have lately given way to IBM’s “Big Blue” and “Watson,” mega-computers with amazing memories and—with Watson—a stunning speech recognition capability that is filtering down to all kinds of devices. If we can talk to machines, aren’t we well on our way to singularity?

For one answer consider the Turing Test, the challenge laid down by the World War II code-breaker Alan Turing. A variation of it has been turned into a recurring world competitions. The challenge is to construct a “chatterbot” that can pass for a human in blind side-by-side “conversations” that include real people. For artificial intelligence engineers, the trick is to fool a panel of questioners at least 30 percent of the time over 25 minutes. According to the BBC, a recent winner was a computer from the University of Reading in the U.K. It passed itself off as a Ukrainian teen (“Eugene Goostman”) speaking English as a second language.

Machines Lack a Self

In actual fact, humans have nothing to fear. Most measures of “human like” intelligence such as the Turing Test use the wrong yardsticks. These computers are never embodied. The rich information of non-verbal communication is not present, nor can it be. Proximate human features are not enough. For example, Watson’s “face” in its famous Jeopardy challenge a few years ago was a set of cheesy electric lights. Moreover, these smart machines tend to be asked questions that we would ask of Siri or other informational databases. What they “know” is often defined as a set of facts, not feelings. And, of course, these machines lack what we so readily reveal in our conversations with others: that we have a sense of self, that we have an accumulated biography of life experiences that shape our reactions and dispositions, and that we want to be understood.

Just the issue of selfhood should remind us of the special status that comes from living through dialogue with others. A sense of self is complicated, but it includes the critical ability to be aware of another’s awareness of who we are. If this sounds confusing, it isn’t. This process is central to all but the most perfunctory communication transactions. As we address others we are usually “reading” their responses in light of what we believe they already have discerned about us. We triangulate between our perceptions of who we are, who they are, and what they are thinking about our behavior. This all happens in a flash, forming what is sometimes called “emotional intelligence.” It’s an ongoing form of self-monitoring that functions to oil the complex relationships. Put this sequence together, and you get a transaction that is full of feedback loops that involve estimates if intention and interest, and—frequently—a general desire born in empathy to protect the feelings of the other.

It’s an understatement to say these transactions are not the stuff of machine-based intelligence, and probably never can be. We are not computers. As Walter Isaacson reminds us in his recent book, The Innovators, we are carbon based creatures with chemical and electrical impulses that mix to create unique and idiosyncratic individuals. This is when the organ of the brain becomes so much more: the biographical homeland of an experience-saturated mind. With us there is no central processor. We are not silicon-based. There are the nearly infinite forms of consciousness in a brain with 100-billion neurons with 100-trillion connections. And because we often “think” in ordinary language, we are so much more—and sometimes less—than an encyclopedia on two legs.

black bar

cropped Revised square logo