Category Archives: Problem Practices

Communication behavior or analysis that is often counter-productive

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The Rise of the Mental Health Lexicon

 Some clinical terms function as rhetorical shortcuts that are meant to be dismissive.

Language within a culture flows and changes like a river.  One of the more interesting transformations over the relatively short period of the last 30 years has been a clear increase in the use of mental health labels in everyday discourse.  What was once clinical language has become commonplace in ordinary conversation.  We now use terms that once had a clear diagnostic function seen, among other places, in discussions of the President’s fitness for office. Writers from nearly every quarter wonder if he is “paranoid,” “driven by conspiracy theories,” “compulsive” in his use of Twitter, “delusional,” “manic,” “narcissistic” or a “sociopath.”  Indeed, mental health experts suggest Trump really does fit the clinical definition of the last label.  But I suspect that some of the other mental health terms have different rhetorical functions.  We also see there terms even in ordinary settings.  In my line of work as a professor even students who cut classes may well be described as a potentially suffering from a chronic mental health problems rather than bad judgment.

Clinical language has several interesting applications.  One is to use a label that allows us to more or less dismiss another person for not meeting the general tenets of social competence.  This heavy stigma is one reason that mental health labels used to be uttered in a whisper.  The truth is that Trump easily offends our understandings of how an ordinary and empathetic person should relate.  But its a more of a satisfying blow to weigh him down with language that flirts with the borderlands of the insane.

Using the lexicon of sanity makes it possible to offer a faux diagnosis that allows us to take a person less seriously. 

Some of this is harmless and simply part of the constant flow of language. But the use of mental health terminology as a rhetorical device has another subtle consequence.  Using the lexicon of sanity makes it possible to offer a faux diagnosis that allows us to take a person less seriously.  In a nutshell, the language tends to deny the person the rights to full agency.  Think of “agency” as the idea that we are fully in charge of our lives: capable of making of managing our own affairs.  Illnesses of all sorts can be crushing blows to what we take to be our birthright of self-control. In some form or another an illness takes charge. This is why we give a person a pass if  we hear about their debilitating headaches or hypertension.  No moral judgment is made.  Similarly, it would be cruel to fault a person for having a malignant tumor.  Mental health terms can do much the same, but the pass is converted into a slight. The effect of using the lexicon is to devalue a person’s basic social capabilities: their capacities for acting within reasonable norms. Now, of course, many of us proudly proclaim our “attention deficits” and “compulsions.” But more of us are willing to accept them as excuses.

If we tell a friend we are “depressed,” they might find it easy to urge us to “snap out of it” or “cheer up.”  But a person with clinical depression is not so easily advised. Their condition may be less in their immediate control. We often assume that a drug will do what they cannot do for themselves.  This is mostly good.  But the downside is the patient’s seeming loss of agency.  We see them as not being able to help themselves.

All of this is a reminder that we naturally seek an advantage over those who fail to measure up.  Rhetorical maneuvers involving clinical terms can foreclose the necessity to deal with a person and all of their complexities.

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Phrases Ready for Retirement

 These mental cheats sacrifice accuracy for the rhetorical advantage of certainty.  And that’s more than we should accept.

It’s not unusual to catch someone’s thought in mid-flight that deserves an arrow that will bring it back down to earth.  Habits and overuse make it easy to overlook vapid phrases that pretend to pass as insights. In complex times like these they tend to do violence to the Truth, which needs much more context and detail.

Here’s a short list of some common offenders.

“It’s a simple as that.” 

We know when we say it or hear it that we’ve probably uttered a useless overstatement.  But its declarative certainty is attractive, and maybe a good way to foreclose debate.  But humans have grown smarter over the years about the complexities of living and interacting with others.  Einstein famously noted that “as our circle of knowledge expands, so does the circumference of darkness surrounding it.”  More knowledge makes us aware of a bigger spectrum of unknowns.  We are wiser by grasping the limitations of simple nostrums.

When someone issues this phrase it’s usually a hammer blow for subtlety. Imagine the phrase tacked on to these common thoughts:  People aren’t trying if their marriages don’t work. . .  Teens are obsessive about sex. . .  New Yorkers are pushy. . .  World War II was started by Germany . . . , and so on.  None of  these claims have earned the right to be worded as unequivocal.  We may not know everything these days, but we should know that the actions of humans and organizations are rarely explained with one dimensional understandings.

“This isn’t rocket science.” 

I’m guilty of saying this.  But, in fact, the task of accounting for human action is arguably harder than working with the predictable usually effects found in the physical sciences.  To be sure, we are right to be impressed with scientific achievements.  Many of us were stunned to see the three SpaceX booster rockets that went into space recently and then returned to land feet first on the launch pads where they started.  Wow.  (Here’s the clip, if you missed it.)  But the laws of physics and the behavior of machines usually make it possible to produce results that can be replicated.

Put another way, the sciences are assisted by unequivocal baselines.  And that makes events more orderly.  But try accounting for where a cat will light after circling a room, or why your Uncle Mort insists that raw celery is the world’s best food. In these realms we are talking about nearly infinite causes that may never be known.

“I remember it like it was yesterday.”  

In all likelihood, you probably don’t.  We’ve learned a lot about the natural fallibility of memory.  We may indeed “see” distant events or feelings with what seems like pristine clarity.  But memory research has advanced to a stage where it is sensible to call into question those things about which we remain all too certain.  For example, there is increasing evidence that eyewitness accounts in trials and routine police work are more inaccurate than we used to expect.  Or try this test: visit your old grade school, or a neighborhood  that was home several decades ago.  Putting aside various improvements, some features that seemed so vivid will probably be different than you may recall. The house I lived in as a pre-teen now looks so much smaller than what I remember.  And what happened to what I remember as a spacious back yard?  The question to my siblings is always “How did we all manage to fit?”

“What’s the story?”  

Cable news hosts are fond of turning to a fellow journalist on camera to ask this obvious question.  They are surely right to ask it.  But if postmodernism has taught us anything, it is to look for broader and multiple narratives.  The problem with the question as worded is its singular form.  Human events should  lead us to expect stories and alternate narratives.  Almost any complex human action is likely to produce different versions about was actually going on.  Facts and features of narratives almost always spring from selected elements, different perspectives, and points of view we are predisposed to confirm.

All of these phrases are mental cheats. They sacrifice accuracy for the rhetorical advantage of certainty.  And that’s more than we should accept.